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Savage v. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. Adv. Op. 2 (January 29, 2009)
CRIMINAL LAW- SENTENCING AND PROBATION1
Summary
Consolidated petitions for writs of mandamus that challenged district court failures to
consider applications pursuant to NRS 484.37941 on their merits.
Disposition/Outcome
Petitions granted.
Factual and Procedural History
This opinion consolidated two criminal defendants’ petitions for writs of mandamus. Both
defendants were charged with their third DUI offense and both applied to enter treatment in lieu
of prison under NRS 484.37941.2
In Savage v. District Court, Docket No. 50445, the state charged Savage with his third DUI.
Savage made a plea agreement and attempted to plead guilty, simultaneously applying for a
treatment program under NRS 484.37941. The district court rejected his plea, explaining that
there was no treatment program available in his county because the Division of Parole and
Probation (DOPP) would not oversee a program, and the district court similarly was unable to
implement such a program. The court postponed sentencing and encouraged Savage’s attorney to
consult with his client.
In Hernandez v. District Court, Docket No. 51333, Hernandez plead guilty to a third-offense
DUI and applied for treatment under NRS 484.37941. The district court stated it was unable to
oversee a treatment program and that it believed that NRS 484.37941 was an unfunded mandate.
Consequently, the court denied the motion for treatment.
Both Savage and Hernandez filed petitions for writs of mandamus, requesting the Court to
order the district courts to consider the merits of their treatment applications.
Discussion
The Court first considered whether writs of mandamus were appropriate remedies in the
two cases and then turned to the three questions presented by the petitions: (1) whether NRS
484.37941 requires courts to consider the merits of treatment applications, (2) whether NRS
484.37941 requires counties without treatment programs to create those programs (3) whether
district courts exceed their jurisdiction by ordering the DOPP to supervise offenders in treatment,
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By Moorea Katz
NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.37941 (2007) allows persons charged with their third DUI offense to request
that the court order them into an alcoholism treatment program in lieu of prison. If a court grants a
treatment application, it then must put the offender on probation and suspend sentencing until completion
of the program, or until the court deems that treatment is not benefiting the offender. If the offender
successfully completes treatment, the offender only receives a misdemeanor conviction whereas a thirdtime DUI offense otherwise receives a felony conviction.
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and (4) whether by requiring district courts to administer treatment programs, NRS 484.37941
violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.
Writ Relief is appropriate
The Court reasoned that Hernandez’s guilty plea was intrinsically intertwined with his
opportunity to enter treatment, and that in this limited circumstance he should not be prevented
from challenging the district court’s denial of his motion before proceeding to trial. The Court
rejected the State’s argument that because Savage had not entered a guilty plea, writ relief was
inappropriate. The Court reasoned that the sole reason Savage had not entered his plea was that
the court would not consider his treatment application. The Court also reasoned that for both
cases writ relief was appropriate because the petitions raised important questions of law that
required clarification.
NRS 484.37941 requires courts to consider the merits of treatment applications
The Court concluded that under both the plain language and the legislative history of
NRS 484.37941, the statute requires district courts to consider the merits of offenders’ treatment
applications.
NRS 484.37941 provides that third-time DUI offenders, at the time they enter their pleas,
may apply to enter alcoholism treatment programs. The statute further provides that if the State
opposes a motion for treatment, the court shall hold a hearing on the motion. The Court
concluded that because the statute mandates that a court hold a hearing on a disputed application,
and must “decide the matter” when the applications are not opposed, the statute requires courts to
consider applications on their merits, and determine whether a particular offender is a good
candidate for treatment.
The Court also found that the legislative history of NRS 484.37941 supports this holding.
The Court referred to Senate Committee Hearing minutes illustrating committee members’
concern that lack of treatment facilities in rural counties would prevent offenders in those
counties from obtaining treatment.3 Therefore, the Court reasoned, district courts are required to
consider motions for treatment and the decision whether to consider them is not in their
discretion. The Court concluded that the district courts erred in basing their decision to not
consider the treatment applications on the lack of treatment programs in their counties.
NRS 484.37941 does not require rural counties to create treatment programs
The Court next considered whether NRS 484.37941, by allowing offenders to apply for
treatment, effectively requires rural counties that lack such programs to create them. The Court
concluded that nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests that rural counties are
required to create treatment programs. The Court also reasoned that the statute does not require
district courts to create these programs because the statute simply provides that courts must
oversee treatment, and this requirement is not equivalent to mandating district courts create the
programs. Furthermore, NRS 484.37941(5) requires district courts to administer treatment
programs pursuant to two other statutory sections, neither of which mandate that courts create
3

Hearing on S.B. 277 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Leg. (Nev., April 3, 2007);
Hearing on S.B. 277 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Leg. (Nev., April 10, 2007).

treatment programs if they are unavailable.4
District courts have jurisdiction to order the DOPP to supervise offenders approved for treatment.
The Court reasoned that because NRS 484.37941 requires district courts to place offenders
on probation without entering a judgment if they approve those offenders’ treatment applications,
the statute also bestows upon the courts the jurisdiction to order the DOPP to supervise those
offenders placed in treatment. The Court reviewed other statutory provisions allowing district
courts to place offenders on probation and found that NRS 484.37941 was no different from
those. Importantly, the Court held that NRS 176A.400(4) requires district courts that put
offenders on probation to order the DOPP to supervise those offenders. For these reasons, the
Court held that the district courts erred in holding they lacked the jurisdiction to order the DOPP
to supervise offenders approved for treatment.
NRS 484.37941 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
The Court addressed the district courts’ conclusions that by requiring courts to administer
treatment programs, NRS 484.37941 violates the separation of powers doctrine because this
responsibility is typically reserved to the DOPP. The Court found that the statute requires district
courts only to “administer the program of treatment” whereas the DOPP still must supervise
those offenders in treatment. Therefore, according to the Court, the statute does not merge
judicial power with executive power, but rather, the two powers overlap, which is permissible
under the Nevada Constitution.

Conclusion
The Court granted both petitions for writs of mandamus, holding that NRS 484.37941
requires courts to consider third-time DUI offenders’ applications for treatment on their merits,
but that the statute does not require counties lacking treatment programs, nor district courts in
those counties, to implement these programs if they do not already exist. Additionally, the Court
held that NRS 484.37941, when taken with other statutory provisions, bestows upon courts the
jurisdiction to order the DOPP to supervise offenders approved for treatment. Lastly, the Court
held that courts’ administration of treatment programs does not violate the separation-of-powers
doctrine. Therefore, the Court ordered the district courts to consider Savage’s and Hernandez’s
treatment applications on their merits.
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 458.320 (2007) (requiring courts to order treatment facilities to conduct
examinations of offenders and allowing the courts to determine whether to order treatment and to impose
conditions upon probations if necessary); NEV. REV. STAT. § 458.330 (2007) (allowing courts to defer
sentencing pending treatment and outlining procedures for courts that find an offender is not benefiting
from treatment).

